George Will's NRO piece about it is a worthy contribution to that. He begins by providing a glimpse of the book's gist:
Robert Gordon’s The Rise and Fall of American Growth argues that an unprecedented and unrepeatable “special century” of life-changing inventions has produced unrealistic expectations, so the future will disappoint: “The economic revolution of 1870 to 1970 was unique. . . . No other era in human history, either before or since, combined so many elements in which the standard of living increased as quickly and in which the human condition was transformed so completely.”
In many ways, the world of 1870 was more medieval than modern. Three necessities — food, clothing, shelter — absorbed almost all consumer spending. No household was wired for electricity. Flickering light came from candles and whale oil, manufacturing power from steam engines, water wheels, and horses. Urban horses, alive and dead, complicated urban sanitation. Window screens were rare, so insects commuted to and fro between animal and human waste outdoors and the dinner table. A typical North Carolina housewife in the 1880s carried water into her home eight to ten times daily, walking 148 miles a year to tote 36 tons of it. Few children were in school after age twelve.Then along came Edison's light bulb, Karl Benz's internal combustion engine, the Wright brothers' airplane, radio, Henry Ford's assembly line, air conditioning, penicillin, heart transplants, moon landings and the like.
And then the pace of innovation, as well as economic growth slowed.
Today the inflation-adjusted median wage of American males is lower than in 1969, and median household income is lower than when this century began. If the growth rate since 1970 had matched that of 1920–1970, instead of being one-third of it, per capita GDP in 2014 would have been $97,300 instead of $50,600.Gordon's view, shared by Will, is that neither central planning nor labor-saving gizmos will usher in another boom era:
Gordon doubts the “techno-optimists” who think exotic developments — robots, artificial intelligence, etc. — can match what such by-now-banal developments as electricity and the internal-combustion engine accomplished. There is, however, no reason to expect that medical advances have been exhausted. And there are many reasons to believe that the rapid expansion of regulatory, redistributive government, which can be reformed, has contributed to — it certainly has coincided with — the onset of (relative) economic anemia.
he “fatal conceit” (Friedrich Hayek’s term) is the optimistic delusion that planners can manage economic growth by substituting their expertise for the information generated by the billions of daily interactions of a complex market society. Gordon’s stimulating book expresses a pessimist’s fatal conceit, the belief that we know the future will be less creative than the “special century.”Mark Steyn made much the same point in America Alone, arguing that the past several decades have been devoid of the kinds of big inventions that so dramatically changed life for the previous two or three generations. And way back in 1941, James Burnham, in The Managerial Revolution, accurately foresaw the rise of an administrative elite that would occupy not only an increasingly bloated government but many if not most of the world's largest, bureaucratic-to-the-point-of-being-unwieldy corporations and financial institutions.
Of course, some as-yet-unrecognized mind could prove all these folks wrong. How likely is that, though, in an age in which the plodding yet comfortable pace of life has infantilized everyone from university students to presidential candidates?
But tailor-made for blame and fertile fodder for a demagogue claiming to be able to MAKE America Great Again: "The general consensus that innovation does not cause long-term unemployment held strong for the first decade of the 21st century, though it continued to be challenged by a number of academic works, and by popular works such as Marshall Brain's Robotic Nation and Martin Ford's The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future. Concern about technological unemployment grew in 2013, due in part to a number of studies predicting substantially increased technological unemployment in forthcoming decades, and empirical evidence that in certain sectors, employment is falling worldwide despite rising output, thus discounting globalisation and offshoring as the only causes of increasing unemployment.
ReplyDeleteIn 2013, professor Nick Bloom of Stanford University stated there had recently been a major change of heart concerning technological unemployment among his fellow economists. In 2014 the Financial Times reported that the impact of innovation on jobs has been a dominant theme in recent economic discussion. According to the academic and former politician Michael Ignatieff writing in 2014, questions concerning the effects of technological change have been "haunting democratic politics everywhere".[54] Concerns have included evidence showing worldwide falls in employment across sectors such as manufacturing, falls in pay for low and medium skilled workers stretching back several decades even as productivity continues to rise, and the occurrence of "jobless recoveries" after recent recessions. The 21st century has seen a variety of skilled tasks partially taken over by machines, including translation, legal research and even low level journalism. Care work, entertainment, and other tasks requiring empathy, previously thought safe from automation, have also begun to be performed by robots.
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Didja catch that--"haunting democratic politics everywhere." Small d.
ReplyDeleteA business has a responsibility to its owners to find the least costly way to conduct its operations.
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