Russia has goals in the Middle East; post-America has diddly

Among the urgent matters on post-America's world-affairs plate, Russia merits constant attention.

There are two pieces I've seen this morning, each of which takes a somewhat different view on the motivations behind, and implications of, Russia's withdrawal of all its troops from Syria, but each of which winds up coming to the same general conclusion: Russia is a major influential actor on the world stage, and post-America is not.

Max Boot, writing in the LA Times, says Putin has achieved his two main objectives and therefore has no need to maintain the presence of force in Syria:

This week, the world is equally dumbfounded by the Russian president's announcement that he is withdrawing the "main part" of his forces in Syria. No one knows how big a part of the Russian military presence — consisting of some 4,000 troops and 50 combat aircraft — will return to the motherland or what exactly prompted this latest move.

Putin loves to spring surprises on the world, and that's not hard to do when you are an absolute autocrat who doesn't have to rally popular approval for your actions. Just as in the 1930s, it seems that today dictatorships act while democracies dither.  

In his latest interview in the Atlantic with Jeffrey Goldberg, Obama tries to wave away what Putin has done in Syria and Ukraine: "The fact that he invades Crimea or is trying to prop up Assad doesn't suddenly make him a player. You don't see him in any of these meetings out here helping to shape the agenda. For that matter, there's not a G20 meeting where the Russians set the agenda around any of the issues that are important."

It's telling that Obama thinks that the only thing that matters is the agenda at international gab-fests. That's because the president, like most European heads of state, lives in a 21st century, post-power world where international law is more meaningful than brute force. Putin, by contrast, inhabits a 19th century, Realpolitik world where strongmen act to advance their own interests with scant regard for the feelings of other states, much less of multilateral institutions such as the G20 or the United Nations. In the clash between these two incompatible visions of the world, there is no doubt which one is winning: From Crimea to Syria, Putin is rewriting the rules of the international game in his favor. 

In the case of Syria, Putin's objectives are two-fold. First, he wants to ensure that Assad, a longtime Russian ally (and buyer of Russian weapons), is not toppled. Last fall, rebel forces were advancing and threatening Assad's grip on power. No longer. The Russian intervention was ostensibly supposed to attack Islamic State. In fact, some 90% of Russian sorties have been directed not at its strongholds but at more moderate rebel groups backed by the United States. This has enabled Assad to regain part of Aleppo province and to consolidate his hold on an eastern corridor running from Damascus to the Mediterranean Sea.
Putin's second objective is to reassert Russian power in the world — to make clear that Russia is not isolated after the unlawful invasion of Ukraine and that, in fact, it is ready to challenge American primacy in the Middle East, a region where the U.S. has been the dominant power for decades. That mission also has been accomplished. As a bonus, Putin even got to show off the capabilities of a new generation of advanced weapons systems, from fighter jets to cruise missiles, that he hopes to sell to eager customers around the world.

Putin probably figures that it's time to ratchet down his commitment before the cost of intervention grows. Tellingly, his decision came shortly after a Syrian MiG-21 was shot down by a portable surface-to-air missile — reportedly a U.S.-made Stinger. This would have been a grim reminder to Putin of the Russian war in Afghanistan. He has no desire to risk such a costly conflict again — and no need to do so. 

Putin can achieve his limited objectives in Syria at much lower cost, and if Assad gets into trouble again, it's easy enough for Putin to send back more Russian forces. He is not, after all, giving up the newly established Russian airbase in Latakia province. It will now be Russia's second military installation abroad, alongside the long-standing Russian port facility nearby at Tartus on the Syrian coast.

Ralph Peters, writing in the NY Post, says that Putin came up against the limits of what an alliance with a radical Muslim regime even more duplicitous than he is can achieve:

Putin didn’t go into Syria because Assad was a pal. He sent in his air power and his commandos to expand Russia’s regional influence as American power ebbed. He thought he saw a not-to-be-missed strategic opportunity.
And he certainly expected Assad to be grateful for his salvation at Russian hands.
But gratitude isn’t in the Middle East’s repertoire. As Americans discovered painfully, the region’s thanks resemble the bite of a cobra.
There’s even a cost factor: Russia’s economy’s shrinking, and Putin’s been forced to slow his cherished military renewal. Even the dumb bombs dropped on civilians in Syria carry a price.
Still, Putin’s abrupt departure has to have more behind it than a spurious desire to further peace talks, the need to save money or personal pique at Assad.
The long bet is that his generals, diplomats and intelligence hands on the ground were shocked by the degree to which Iran already and irrevocably dominates Syria. And Iraq. And Lebanon.
With a shudder, Putin recognized that his air campaign would ultimately benefit an emerging Persian/Iranian empire, rather than expanding Moscow’s influence. Similarly, our air campaign and special operations against ISIS, although necessary, will inevitably strengthen Tehran’s regional dominance (we gave away Iraq, but we still do the maintenance).
We’re trapped, but Putin wasn’t. So he got out.
Those of us who’ve warned of a burgeoning Iranian empire haven’t found much traction in Washington, where the current president clings to his appalling nuclear deal. And the Middle East still seems far away from the Potomac’s prospering shores. But it’s a very different deal for Putin.
Russia’s newest czar thought he was playing the Iranians, using them as leverage against US influence, selling them arms at a premium and using them as cannon fodder on the ground in Syria — while his combat aircraft soared invulnerably overhead.
But to paraphrase Shakespeare, Putin drank and only then saw the spider in the cup.
Contrary to his expectations of finding a pliable ally in Iran, he found the Iranians in control, glad to borrow his air force, arrogant and disdainful in Damascus (and Baghdad) and well on the path to dominating a vast stretch of strategically vital territory. And Iran has no interest in playing junior partner to anyone — least of all a traditional Christian enemy.
Suddenly, Putin had a vision of a nuclear-armed, radical-Shia empire on Russia’s southern flank. Those Iranian missiles that can reach Israel? They can reach major Russian cities, too.
Putin’s initial bet on Shia Iran also backfired by turning the Islamic world’s Sunni majority against him — not least Saudi Arabia, which can continue to hold down the price of oil and gas, punishing Russia’s economy far more than it wounds American fracking efforts. And Sunni terrorists have taken a renewed interest in Russia.

So, according to Peters, it was basically a matter of cutting losses upon realizing just what a rough neighborhood he was doing business in.

But bot Boot and Peters conclude with an obvious truth: post-America, led by the Most Equal Comrade, is not a factor in what is transpiring in that region.

Which affects post-American policy toward Iran itself. As Putin knows, you have to be a player to have any influence in a situation like this:

The United States is preparing for a diplomatic showdown with Russia as it prepares to release an official report accusing Iran of breaching international accords prohibiting the test firing of ballistic missiles, according to Obama administration officials familiar with the situation.

The United States has been pressuring partner nations on the U.N. Security Council to publicly chastise Iran for a series of ballistic missile tests that the Obama administration claims violate international accords.

Russia broke ranks with the United States this week by siding with Iran, which claims that the tests do not violate the recently-implemented nuclear agreement.

Iran and its allies argue that the U.N. resolutions governing the nuclear deal only suggest that the Islamic Republic abstain from testing ballistic missiles, a claim the United States has publicly opposed in recent days.

One U.S. official familiar with discussions surrounding the issue told the Washington Free Beacon on Tuesday that the administration is now gearing up for a diplomatic battle with Russia at the U.N.

The United States and its allies on the Security Council, including Germany, will submit a report to the U.N. Security Council by the end of the week outlining Iranian violations of U.N. Resolution 2231, which governs the nuclear agreement reached last year.

“Contrary to what the Russians believe, we, the U.S., strongly believe that the launches by Iran do fall under the scope of 2231,” the official, who was not authorized to discuss the issue on record, told the Free Beacon.

“Ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a range of at least 300 kilometers are inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons,” the source said. “We intend to submit the relevant technical information needed to make the point and we’ll go from there.”

The source noted that U.S. officials “expect this will continue to be a point of contention with the Russians.”

In its first public comment on the issue, Russia stated this week that it stands with Iran, which has long claimed that ballistic missile tests are no longer banned by the U.N.

Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin stated on Monday that the newest U.N. resolution governing the nuclear agreement only suggests that Iran stop test firing missiles.

“A call is different from a ban so legally you cannot violate a call, you can comply with a call or you can ignore the call, but you cannot violate a call,” Churkin was quoted as saying. “The legal distinction is there.”

These comments have set the stage for a showdown with Moscow, and left State Department officials scrambling to respond on Monday.

State Department spokesman John Kirby told reporters on Monday that the United States is preparing to “raise the matter directly” at the Security Council.

Kirby said that the United States differs with Russia on the matter and views Iran’s missiles tests as “provocative and destabilizing.”

“They are also, at the very least, inconsistent with, but more practically in defiance of, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which of course codified the Iran deal,” Kirby added.

While Kirby declined to elaborate on the differences between previous U.N. resolutions and current ones, he told reporters “We’re comfortable we have a strong case.”

One foreign policy consultant familiar with discussions on the issue told the Free Beacon that the administration’s U.N. team in New York has been working overtime to convince officials in Washington, D.C., to aggressively pursue the issue.

Samantha Power, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., “is clearly furious with Russian protection for Iran and is dragging the rest of the administration along with her in an attempt to do something that holds the Iranians accountable for their illegal missile launches,” the source said.

Iran hawks in Congress also have been pressuring the administration to take aggressive action aimed at holding Iran accountable for these tests.

Russia can say to post-America, "Look, you were the party to last summer's agreement that expected Iran to live up to it to the letter. We never had such noble expectations, having done business with the mullahs for quite some time.And we're still doing business with them. How about that? Just sold them S-300 anti-aircraft batteries. You're hardly in a position to get them to stop conducting missile tests. Us? We've never harbored any illusions about the Iranians. In fact, we have a lot more respect for nation-states that aggressively pursue their own interests than we do countries that set store by international pow-wows in fancy hotels, even if those nation-states' interests must be studied to see how they fit with ours, and what we might have to do in the long term."

Russia plays chess. Post-America plays patty-cake.