Saturday, September 12, 2020

Three major situations going on in the Middle East / Mediterranean - one encouraging, two that are jitters-worthy

 The recent peace agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are laudable and fraught with possibilities for long-term regional stability and comity. 

Some aspects of the background leading up to these deals are noteworthy. One, the process of the groundwork being laid had been ongoing for some time. In each case, each party knew that trade and technology interests - and, at least as importantly, a common interest in seeing that Iran cannot establish its Tehran-to-the-Mediterranean crescent - provided the impetus for focusing on commonalities rather than differences. Two, these two Arab nations have a much different history than a lot of their neighbors. They have evolved out of a distillation of a national identity based on many ethnicities, for reasons of their locations along trade routes, participating in their development. They are smaller by comparison to, say, Iraq or Syria or Saudi Arabia. And, say what one will about strong monarchical forms of government, that element has shaped them differently that how things have evolved in countries that have earnestly tried to adopt, or at least ape, Western-style representative democracy. 

These factors make possible a considerable degree of confidence that the dynamic is shifting in the Middle East, at least to some degree, that the relative influence of various players of even fairly recent times is giving way to something new. 

A glaring obstacle to this path forward is Lebanon. Lebanon is one of the great tragedies of history. It's well-known that Beirut was, for many years, called the Paris of the Middle East. Broad boulevards, fashionable shops, a vital banking industry, a rich culture the ingredients of which included such influences as a few types of Christianity, Druze culture, the presence of both Sunni and Shiite Islam, and natural beauty gave it a global reputation as a desirable place to visit. Then came the 1975 - 1990 civil war, with its complex web of players and carnage and intrigue that would permanently impact the country's identity. 

It's now a failed state. The shell of its government is pretty much just a vehicle for Hezbollah to take the reins of power:

Lebanon, trapped in a constitutional vise evolved to ensure representation for its many sectarian communities while impeding the rise of cross-sectarian or secular parties, is hurtling toward full-scale breakdown. It is one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world, owing to entrenched patronage networks run by sectarian fiefs. The governing class plays each tribe against the other, Sunni against Shia against Christian against Druze, to enrich themselves while immiserating the nation. Woeful economic mismanagement has proceeded for many long years without respite. Combined with the arrival of the pandemic, rising unemployment has now plunged more than half the country—pushing upwards to three-quarters—into poverty.

To make matters worse, the power behind the throne in Lebanon resides with a vicious militia-cum-political party that is resistant to change and that refuses to treat Lebanese as fellow citizens. Hezbollah is the most conspicuous legacy of Syria’s long occupation of the country, and it has increasingly disfigured the proper operations of the government. Facilitated by Persian power and largesse, the Shia terrorist organization has risen to become the primus inter pares of Lebanese affairs. In concert with its domestic allies, the Party of God holds the majority in Parliament and dominates the government’s security and foreign policies.

This has global implications, and that doesn't just mean Iran. China sees a juicy opportunity to exert its influence:

If the people of Lebanon were pushed up against a wall of destitution and despair, they would lose hope, so the diabolical reasoning goes. Hopelessness would prepare them to accept anything, including a new overseer in the form of China offering a lifeline of billions of dollars in “aid” and pledging to rebuild vital infrastructure like the hammered Beirut port. This would effectively sever ailing Lebanon from its traditional Western and Arab strategic, political, and cultural moorings, taking it eastward toward Iran and China. It is no secret that Hezbollah is the designated agent entrusted with engineering such a shift, premised on compounding the misery of the already exhausted Lebanese as a quick way to oust the West permanently from the Arab Levant. Hassan Nasrallah, secretary-general of Hezbollah, even came on television several weeks ago to declare that he had secured a commitment from Beijing to “help,” if only the Lebanese would jump on this opportunity. Among other hidden benefits, China would gain a naval foothold for the first time on the Mediterranean Sea, close to Israel, and decisive economic influence in a vital gateway linking Europe through the Levant to the rest of the Middle East. Lebanon would thus become another feather in the cap of China’s expanding Belt and Road scheme with its not-so-concealed military dimension.

French president Emmanuel Macron has been to Lebanon twice since the gargantuan ammonium nitrate explosion last month, offering aid and signaling that the West is aware of the stakes. 

Europe has reason to be concerned about another situation in that region. Two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, are squaring off over gas and oil interests in the eastern Mediterranean:

The crisis has been deepening in recent months with the French president, Emmanuel Macron, leading those inside the EU opposing Turkey’s increasingly military foreign policy and saying Turkey can no longer be seen as partner in the Mediterranean. He has offered French military support to the Greek prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, including the possible sale of 18 Rafale jets.

The issue was on the agenda of a meeting of the Med7 group of southern Mediterranean leaders on the French island of Corsica on Thursday and again at an EU council meeting on 23 September that will discuss imposing severe sanctions on the already struggling Turkish banking sector over its demand for access to large swaths of the eastern Mediterranean.

Germany, the lead mediator between Turkey and Greece, is exploring an enhanced customs union between Turkey and the EU to calm the dispute, which has been exacerbated by vast hydrocarbon discoveries over the past decade in the eastern Mediterranean.

Turkey has long sought a broader customs union with the EU, and although Greece might see any such offer as a reward for bullying, Germany believes both carrots and sticks are needed to persuade Turkey to change its strategy..

But Germany is also warning Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, that his current unilateral strategy is a commercial dead end, since no private gas company is going to touch cooperation with Turkey if it is trying to exploit illegal claims on gas reserves.

The stakes are getting higher. Once again, Macron is very much involved:

Macron has already increased the French naval presence in the sea, and called for withdrawal of the Turkish reconnaissance ship Oruç Reis, accompanied by Turkish naval ships. The ship is undertaking seismic surveys in Greek waters south of Cyprus. A key moment may come on 12 September, when the Turkish Navtex warning for Oruç Reis is due to end. If it is extended, the risk of a naval clash between Greece and Turkey two Natopartners either by accident or design rises.

The fear that the conflict could spiral out of control has led to an urgent search for a neutral arbitrator and an agreed agenda for talks. An effort by Nato to start technical naval deconfliction talks was delayed after Greece objected to Nato’s involvement. The Greek foreign minister, Nikos Dendias, insisted that the talks would start only when the threats stopped. He then flew to New York to enlist the help of the UN secretary general, António Guterres.

So the current situation is a mixture of hopeful signs and increasingly heated tensions. 

Western nations interested in seeing stability and a tilt toward Western alliance will have to base their participation in this confluence of events on an understanding that assumptions about regional dynamics from even fairly recently are giving way to new realities.  

 

 

 

 

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