Showing posts with label Turkey. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Turkey. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 5, 2022

Why did Turkey suddenly okay Sweden and Finland joining NATO? It was a case of the necessary prevailing over the ideal

 The American Enterprise Institute's Elizabeth Braw, writing at Defense One, explains that it was a matter of waiting out some internal dynamics in the Scandanavian countries:

What happened? In their trilateral June 28 memorandum—which NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and the Biden administration had no small part in bringing about—the three countries agree that “as prospective NATO Allies, Finland and Sweden extend their full support to Turkiye against threats to its national security. To that effect, Finland and Sweden will not provide support to YPG/PYD [Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units and the associated Democratic Union Party], and the organisation described as FETO in Turkiye.” It went on: “Finland and Sweden unambiguously condemn all terrorist organisations perpetrating attacks against Turkiye, and express their deepest solidarity with Turkiye and the families of the victims.”

There was one particular Swedish legislator who was driving a lot of the support for the Kurdish groups:

This was a victory for Turkey. Last November, Sweden’s governing Social Democrats had promised to deepen their cooperation with PYD, a left-wing Syrian Kurdish party that is also an affiliate of Turkey’s PKK. Why would the Social Democrats promise to deepen their cooperation with this unlikely partner? Because they were trying to find a parliamentary majority for their minority government, and to reach the already-precarious position of a one-vote parliamentary majority, they had to assuage Amineh Kakabaveh, a member of parliament who had been sacked from the Left Party and was sitting as an independent. And Kakabaveh, a former Peshmerga fighter, made maximum use of the leverage by demanding support for Kurdish causes. In fact, she seemed to take delight in her sudden power.

But time was not on Kakabaveh's  side:

But in late June, the Swedish parliament completed its term; it will resume after the country’s parliamentary elections in September. Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson no longer owed anything to Kakabaveh, who can’t be reelected, and could sign the memorandum with Turkey. So, of course, could Finland, which was never really a concern of Turkey’s in the first place.

The bargain finally struck certainly has a lot of benefits for Turkey:

Although the devil of every intergovernmental agreement is in the implementation, the Swedish-Finnish-Turkish memorandum was a certainly a victory for Turkey. In addition to denouncing support for the PYD, Sweden and Finland promised to lift their suspension of arms exports to Turkey and to “address Turkey's pending deportation or extradition requests of terror suspects expeditiously and thoroughly, taking into account information, evidence and intelligence provided by Turkey.” 

What that means was explained by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkish media: Sweden will have to extradite 73 suspected terrorists to Turkey, he announced. Washington, meanwhile, signaled that it’s willing to sell Ankara new F-16 fighter jets and modernization kits for its existing F-16s.

Mutual security comes with costs:

. . . as a senior official in a NATO member state told me, “Sweden and Finland have learned their first lesson in collective defense”: some members of the collective may be difficult, obnoxious even, but for the benefit of enhanced security for all you have to work with them. 

History provides many examples of nation-states having to hold their noses to pursue bigger-picture objectives. This is one of them. At a time of gruesome behavior and alarming rhetoric on the part of Russia, the West needs to provide the most united front it can muster. 


 


 

 


Tuesday, June 28, 2022

Turkey finally gets on board with Finland and Sweden joining NATO

 This ought to give Putin pause:

Office of the President of the Republic of Finland
Press release 41/2022
28 June 2022

Today in Madrid, before the beginning of the NATO Summit, we had a thorough meeting with President of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Prime Minister of Sweden Magdalena Andersson, facilitated by Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg.

As a result of that meeting, our foreign ministers signed a trilateral memorandum which confirms that Türkiye will at the Madrid Summit this week support the invitation of Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO. The concrete steps of our accession to NATO will be agreed by the NATO Allies during the next two days, but that decision is now imminent.

Our joint memorandum underscores the commitment of Finland, Sweden and Türkiye to extend their full support against threats to each other’s security. Us becoming NATO Allies will further strengthen this commitment.

I realize that this afternoon's avalanche of big news (Maxwell's 20-year sentence, Cassidy Hutchinson's J6 testimony, the Rasmussen poll showing that half of likely voters approve of SCOTUS ruling in Dobbs) presents us with a dizzying number of claims on our cognitive faculties, but this must not get lost in the shuffle. It shows that a unified front against Russia's barbarism in Ukraine still exists.

 

Saturday, May 14, 2022

Leave it to Erdogan to throw a wrench in the works

 The push for NATO expansion and strengthened Western resolve has hit a road bump:


Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has come out against allowing Sweden and Finland to join Nato, putting the two Nordic countries’ hopes of joining the western military alliance in jeopardy.

 

In a move that could undermine Turkey’s efforts to strengthen ties with the US and Europe in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Erdoğan — whose country has been a Nato member since 1952 — on Friday said he could not take a “positive view” of the two nations’ potential bids for membership.

 

The obstacle was their support for the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK), which has waged a decades-long armed insurgency against the Turkish state, he said. It is classified as a terrorist organisation by Ankara, the US and the EU. Turkey’s president also named a far-left extremist group.

 

“Scandinavian countries are like some kind of guest house for terrorist organisations,” Erdoğan told reporters, referring to the Nordic countries. “They are even in parliament.”

 

He added: “At this point, it’s not possible for us to look positively at this.”

 

Some Swedish officials and MPs have been worried that Turkey could pose the most dangerous opposition to a potential Nato bid, which appears to be backed by most of the alliance’s other 29 members but requires unanimous support.

 

“There are a lot of Kurds in Sweden, there are a lot of MPs with Kurdish background, Sweden has been active on the Kurdish issue — I’m afraid there could be a backlash,” one senior Swedish official said earlier this month.

 

Finnish and Swedish diplomats have been crossing Europe and the Atlantic to curry favour with Nato members, whose ratification is necessary for them to become members.

The Turkish president has a different set of criteria for weighing factors on a situation like this. 

But then, he's harbored prejudice against Kurds all his political life and has a track record of acting on it

In troubled times, people worship self-assured leaders, and Erdogan sees himself as the anointed vessel of Ottoman resurrection. He allowed Islamic State to murder Kurds and unleashed his army on them. He must and can be stopped.

 

Kurds, formerly referred to as Mountain Turks, constitute more than 20% of the country's citizens. Many want independence, but in 1999, the inspirational, formerly separatist Marxist leader of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan, urged peace after being captured and jailed. Most obeyed, but many still dream of uniting with Kurdish enclaves in Syria, Iraq and Iran to re-establish historic Kurdistan.

In 2013, Erdogan promised to recognize Kurdish identity and language, and increase Kurdish liberties. A truce followed, but hostilities resumed in 2015. Erdogan said he was responding to PKK terrorism. The PKK claimed Erdogan destroyed the ceasefire by building dams and security stations in Kurdish regions. In either case, a war was on. Erdogan attacked with helicopter gunships, artillery and armored divisions, murdering thousands and displacing 335,000 mainly Kurdish citizens. A UN report described destroyed villages as moonscapes. 

 Erdogan perceives Kurdish nationalism as an existential threat. 

Recalling the Armenian Genocide, Turkish Nobel Prize winning novelist Orhan Pamuk lamented Erdogan's mass killings of Kurds. Pamuk er was prosecuted for insulting "Turkishness," and public Pamuk book-burnings followed. International outcry spared Pamuk imprisonment, but he sees his once democratic moderate Muslim country heading towards "a regime of terror."


So where do things stand regarding Erdogan vis-a-vis the Kurds at present and in the near-term future?

The economic and foreign struggles of Turkey combined with the fact that the Turkish government historically has pushed its failures onto minority groups means that the ultra-nationalist alliance in Turkey will further scapegoat, persecute, and brutalize minorities, especially the Kurds, because much of their ongoing foreign policy is centered around the Kurds and the alleged existential threat they present. 

There's been a feeling in a lot of quarters for some time that Turkey was arguably the iffiest member of NATO. We now have a rather high-stakes example of this that is going to be thorny to deal with. 

 

 

 

Saturday, September 12, 2020

Three major situations going on in the Middle East / Mediterranean - one encouraging, two that are jitters-worthy

 The recent peace agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are laudable and fraught with possibilities for long-term regional stability and comity. 

Some aspects of the background leading up to these deals are noteworthy. One, the process of the groundwork being laid had been ongoing for some time. In each case, each party knew that trade and technology interests - and, at least as importantly, a common interest in seeing that Iran cannot establish its Tehran-to-the-Mediterranean crescent - provided the impetus for focusing on commonalities rather than differences. Two, these two Arab nations have a much different history than a lot of their neighbors. They have evolved out of a distillation of a national identity based on many ethnicities, for reasons of their locations along trade routes, participating in their development. They are smaller by comparison to, say, Iraq or Syria or Saudi Arabia. And, say what one will about strong monarchical forms of government, that element has shaped them differently that how things have evolved in countries that have earnestly tried to adopt, or at least ape, Western-style representative democracy. 

These factors make possible a considerable degree of confidence that the dynamic is shifting in the Middle East, at least to some degree, that the relative influence of various players of even fairly recent times is giving way to something new. 

A glaring obstacle to this path forward is Lebanon. Lebanon is one of the great tragedies of history. It's well-known that Beirut was, for many years, called the Paris of the Middle East. Broad boulevards, fashionable shops, a vital banking industry, a rich culture the ingredients of which included such influences as a few types of Christianity, Druze culture, the presence of both Sunni and Shiite Islam, and natural beauty gave it a global reputation as a desirable place to visit. Then came the 1975 - 1990 civil war, with its complex web of players and carnage and intrigue that would permanently impact the country's identity. 

It's now a failed state. The shell of its government is pretty much just a vehicle for Hezbollah to take the reins of power:

Lebanon, trapped in a constitutional vise evolved to ensure representation for its many sectarian communities while impeding the rise of cross-sectarian or secular parties, is hurtling toward full-scale breakdown. It is one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world, owing to entrenched patronage networks run by sectarian fiefs. The governing class plays each tribe against the other, Sunni against Shia against Christian against Druze, to enrich themselves while immiserating the nation. Woeful economic mismanagement has proceeded for many long years without respite. Combined with the arrival of the pandemic, rising unemployment has now plunged more than half the country—pushing upwards to three-quarters—into poverty.

To make matters worse, the power behind the throne in Lebanon resides with a vicious militia-cum-political party that is resistant to change and that refuses to treat Lebanese as fellow citizens. Hezbollah is the most conspicuous legacy of Syria’s long occupation of the country, and it has increasingly disfigured the proper operations of the government. Facilitated by Persian power and largesse, the Shia terrorist organization has risen to become the primus inter pares of Lebanese affairs. In concert with its domestic allies, the Party of God holds the majority in Parliament and dominates the government’s security and foreign policies.

This has global implications, and that doesn't just mean Iran. China sees a juicy opportunity to exert its influence:

If the people of Lebanon were pushed up against a wall of destitution and despair, they would lose hope, so the diabolical reasoning goes. Hopelessness would prepare them to accept anything, including a new overseer in the form of China offering a lifeline of billions of dollars in “aid” and pledging to rebuild vital infrastructure like the hammered Beirut port. This would effectively sever ailing Lebanon from its traditional Western and Arab strategic, political, and cultural moorings, taking it eastward toward Iran and China. It is no secret that Hezbollah is the designated agent entrusted with engineering such a shift, premised on compounding the misery of the already exhausted Lebanese as a quick way to oust the West permanently from the Arab Levant. Hassan Nasrallah, secretary-general of Hezbollah, even came on television several weeks ago to declare that he had secured a commitment from Beijing to “help,” if only the Lebanese would jump on this opportunity. Among other hidden benefits, China would gain a naval foothold for the first time on the Mediterranean Sea, close to Israel, and decisive economic influence in a vital gateway linking Europe through the Levant to the rest of the Middle East. Lebanon would thus become another feather in the cap of China’s expanding Belt and Road scheme with its not-so-concealed military dimension.

French president Emmanuel Macron has been to Lebanon twice since the gargantuan ammonium nitrate explosion last month, offering aid and signaling that the West is aware of the stakes. 

Europe has reason to be concerned about another situation in that region. Two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, are squaring off over gas and oil interests in the eastern Mediterranean:

The crisis has been deepening in recent months with the French president, Emmanuel Macron, leading those inside the EU opposing Turkey’s increasingly military foreign policy and saying Turkey can no longer be seen as partner in the Mediterranean. He has offered French military support to the Greek prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, including the possible sale of 18 Rafale jets.

The issue was on the agenda of a meeting of the Med7 group of southern Mediterranean leaders on the French island of Corsica on Thursday and again at an EU council meeting on 23 September that will discuss imposing severe sanctions on the already struggling Turkish banking sector over its demand for access to large swaths of the eastern Mediterranean.

Germany, the lead mediator between Turkey and Greece, is exploring an enhanced customs union between Turkey and the EU to calm the dispute, which has been exacerbated by vast hydrocarbon discoveries over the past decade in the eastern Mediterranean.

Turkey has long sought a broader customs union with the EU, and although Greece might see any such offer as a reward for bullying, Germany believes both carrots and sticks are needed to persuade Turkey to change its strategy..

But Germany is also warning Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, that his current unilateral strategy is a commercial dead end, since no private gas company is going to touch cooperation with Turkey if it is trying to exploit illegal claims on gas reserves.

The stakes are getting higher. Once again, Macron is very much involved:

Macron has already increased the French naval presence in the sea, and called for withdrawal of the Turkish reconnaissance ship Oruç Reis, accompanied by Turkish naval ships. The ship is undertaking seismic surveys in Greek waters south of Cyprus. A key moment may come on 12 September, when the Turkish Navtex warning for Oruç Reis is due to end. If it is extended, the risk of a naval clash between Greece and Turkey two Natopartners either by accident or design rises.

The fear that the conflict could spiral out of control has led to an urgent search for a neutral arbitrator and an agreed agenda for talks. An effort by Nato to start technical naval deconfliction talks was delayed after Greece objected to Nato’s involvement. The Greek foreign minister, Nikos Dendias, insisted that the talks would start only when the threats stopped. He then flew to New York to enlist the help of the UN secretary general, António Guterres.

So the current situation is a mixture of hopeful signs and increasingly heated tensions. 

Western nations interested in seeing stability and a tilt toward Western alliance will have to base their participation in this confluence of events on an understanding that assumptions about regional dynamics from even fairly recently are giving way to new realities.