ADA University professor Damjan Krnjevic Miskovic has a piece at The National Interest today the thrust of which is basically that he's in Henry Kissinger's corner with regard to Ukraine. He does offer his own elaboration of that position, and it's one I find icy in the extreme.
I have no problem, in and of itself, with an assertion he makes in the first paragraph:
Disorder cannot be transcended because human nature is not pliable like Play-Doh: we have deceived ourselves into confusing humanity’s indisputable technological progress with the illusion of our moral progression.
But when he brings two of the most hardass historians of all time into the discussion, we get our first hint of where he's going with his argument:
Only in periods of history in which sophistry is mistaken for prudence and deliberation is permitted to atrophy into wishful thinking can there be a failure to understand that the teachings of thinkers like Thucydides and Machiavelli describe and explain the ways of the world better than any chiliastic alternative.
I really don't even have a problem with Miskovic's summation of the Kissinger view of what is possible regarding a sustainable world order in general:
As Kissinger has rightly underlined, no balance of power system has ever been designed to eliminate crises and conflicts. When functioning properly, such systems of international order are simply meant to limit the scope of domination and conflicts. Their aim is to foster both stability and moderation, not perpetual peace or other such nonsense. Optimally, a balance of power system keeps everyone’s dissatisfaction at a low enough level to not result in attempts to overthrow the basic tenets of the system.
That actually sounds about right. No world-stage arrangement can be expected to be permanent.
I also think his point that the absence of an envisioned outcome in Ukraine, broadly agreed upon in the West, is going to have to be addressed pretty soon:
After one hundred days of driving, the destination remains unknown: the fundamental question of Western war aims in the conflict over Ukraine is simply not being answered—not just in public, which is fine, but most probably in private, too, which is not. Is the aim to engender regime change in the Kremlin? The destruction of Russia’s capability to fight and win wars? A return to Soviet-era living standards for the citizens of the Russian Federation? A war crimes tribunal? A ceasefire? A peace agreement? A territorial settlement? A new European security architecture?
But in the next paragraph, he employs the term "maximalist" to describe Kyiv's position - i.e., that it will not give up any territory that has been seized by Russia, certainly since February of this year, and, if possible, since 2014. As he pursues his argument, it becomes clear he means "maximalist" in a disparaging way.
And then he really get to the crux of his rationale, which is that, since Ukraine is not militarily powerful enough to qualify as a first-tier world power, its demand for justice amounts to nothing more than a ratcheting up of the danger level in relations between those first-tier powers:
. . . the truth is—however uncomfortable it may be to accept—that Ukraine was and remains an object of great power relations and not a subject of international order. Indeed, it would be hard to argue persuasively that a country that depends almost entirely on the free guns, ammo, and reconnaissance supplied by foreign powers is either fully sovereign or fully independent, regardless of its regime type.
Sounds harsh? Well, the support provided to Ukraine by the West comes in the form of arms sales and weapons transfers, military training, real-time intelligence sharing, direct cash grants and massive loan guarantees, an open-door refugee policy, and the threat of repurposing billions of U.S. dollars of seized Russian assets for reconstruction coupled with the promise of spending untold amounts of Western resources on the same. A report by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy indicates that between January 24 and May 10, 2022, the West (this includes Turkey) provided at least €64.6 billion worth of military, financial, and humanitarian commitments to the country, of which €42.9 billion (66 percent) came from the United States (more than half of the U.S. contribution is earmarked for military and weapons purchases). These staggeringly large figures appear to be conservative estimates, given that they neither include commitments by international financial institutions, philanthropies, and other non-governmental actors. And since the publication of that report, such unprecedented quantities may have already doubled.
It is thus becoming increasingly hard to disprove the Kremlin’s claim that the conflict over Ukraine amounts to a proxy war between the West and Russia—or at least that it has become one since the West realized that Moscow’s “special military operation” would not produce the rapid capitulation of the government in Kyiv. Consequently, the West was able to rally behind Kyiv’s “David versus Goliath” narrative, personified by its young and telegenic president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
A bit later, this disparaging use of the term "maximalist" shows up twice in one paragraph:
. . . one or another version of this maximalist posture is irresponsibly being encouraged by various Western leaders, as epitomized by the young and telegenic Estonian prime minister, Kaja Kallas, whose position the New York Times characterizes as Russia “must be defeated at all costs, and without compromise.” Other members of this Western maximalist faction include some (but not all) leaders of former Warsaw Pact states (all of which are now NATO members, which means they’re armed with the near-certain knowledge that they will not have to suffer the consequences of their tough talk), the UK government, and some parts of the Biden administration, including (it sometimes seems) the president himself.
As he unfolds his argument some more, he brings up a point that let's-drop-Ukraine-like-a-hot-potato types of several stripes like to mention: that Ukraine in modern times has a history of instability and corruption. I would offer the view that, even though the invasion by Russia is ongoing, we have already seen a dramatic shift in the political character of Ukraine. There is not only the resolve of President Zelenskyy, but that of the mayors of cities around the country, the clarity with which members of the Ukrainian parliament have spoken on Western media and to Western forums, and, finally, the deep humanity of the citizens-turned-refugees. It may seem like a small matter, but I've been impressed with the number of them who were unwilling to leave their pets behind as they fled their homes.
No, Professor Miskovic, while you may have a point that no one should expect that a Ukrainian victory would usher in an age of unicorns and rainbows, it is in the interest of the West to foster such an outcome because it is right. If you'd like me to put that in more pragmatic terms, letting an unjust outcome suffice sets a precedent of which other hegemonic powers will take note. Want an example? China's designs on Taiwan will be given encouragement.
Sorry, Professor, but what you're dishing up is a highbrow justification for appeasing the bad guy.
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