Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts

Saturday, June 29, 2024

Saturday roundup

 "On the Cooling of Our Love" by Harrison Garlick at Public Discourse  introduced me to a new term: acedia. The definition is "spiritual or mental sloth; apathy."

Garlick steers us to Dante to flesh out our understanding of it:

Acedia is the demon of our day. Yet acedia, or what is more commonly known as sloth, is somehow both ubiquitous and unknown. It is often called the “noonday devil,” as it quietly slips into our lives in the middle of our daily work. It does not come in the darkness of night, but rather in the peak of day when there are no shadows, and it often works within us long before we know it is there.

When we think of slothfulness, we often think of laziness: binge-watching television shows or mindlessly scrolling social media. Acedia, however, is not reducible to mere laziness. The marathon runner or the successful CEO may suffer from acedia just as much as someone we would consider “lazy.” Rather, acedia is a great “cooling” of our love. Thomas Aquinas calls it a “sorrow for spiritual good,” and Saint Isidore says the acedious soul is “inclined to undue response.” 

An illustration of what acedia looks like in practice can be found in Dante’s Purgatorio, the second book in his Divine Comedy. On the fourth terrace of Mount Purgatory, the Roman poet Virgil explains to Dante the Pilgrimthat within man burns a natural love. Like fire, the soul has a natural tendency to rise. It has an endless desire to seek and be satiated in what is beautiful. Dante the Pilgrim sees a group of souls moving in great haste and calling out examples of zeal and slothfulness. It is here, on the fourth terrace, that acedia is purged. 

Dante the Poet couples Virgil’s lecture on love with the purging of acedia to show that slothfulness is a cooling of love. More specifically, he presents sloth as a smothering of the soul’s natural love and a curbing of its desire to seek what is beautiful.

Garlick then looks at the corrosive effect of acedia on the three parts of our souls:

he soul, in the Platonic Christian tradition, has three parts: the intellect, the spirited, and the appetitive. Each part loves (eros) a particular beauty and desires to satiate in it. 

The intellect, for example, loves truth. It desires to conform to reality. The spirited part (thumos) loves nobility. It craves human excellence, a certain beauty of the soul found in virtue. The lowest part of the soul, the appetitive, seeks pleasure. It enjoys good food and drink and laughing with friends, and it finds a certain zenith in the relationship between husband and wife. And, as in all things, the higher always perfects the lower; thus, the soul is first ruled by reason, then the spirited part, and then the appetitive. To disorder the loves of the soul would be to disorder its natural hierarchy.

Virtue is what makes the soul beautiful. As Virgil tells Dante the Pilgrim in Purgatorio, man may control the love burning within him and thus he is accountable for his actions. This love must be disciplined to satiate in the beautiful, in a way that accords with reason. 

For example, the intellect is perfected by prudence. The spirited part is perfected by the virtue of fortitude: the spirited soul will undergo great difficulties in order to attain what is beautiful. Such accomplishments produce honor, fame, and glory. Courage is necessary for the virtuous life. On the other hand, the appetitive part is perfected by the virtue of temperance: it moderates our pleasures and orients them toward true beauty. Justice is the virtue of being well-ordered, and in this way, it adorns the whole soul and moves its parts in harmony. The virtuous soul satiates in beauty and becomes beautiful. The virtuous life is the beautiful life, after all. 

There appears, however, to be a problem with love. When the soul satiates in beauty, it is happy. Yet, the soul does not want to be happy some of the time. It wants to be happy all of the time. In other words, our appetite for happiness is infinite. Yet, the beauties of this life are finite. Here, many souls fall into an endless pattern of consumption, mindlessly moving from one beauty to another in search of happiness. Yet, what if there is a beauty that could truly satisfy our infinite appetite?

The hierarchy of the soul and its corresponding loves—pleasure, nobility, and truth—create what has been called the “ladder of love.” The soul ascends from lesser beauties to greater ones until at the top it discovers beauty itself: God. The human soul’s infinite appetite for happiness finds satisfaction in the infinite beauty of the Divine. It finds a beauty that is not simply satisfaction but overabundance.

In fact, our natural love is enkindled in us by God to lead us back to him. “Love is a good circle” that starts with God, our enkindler, and ends with him, beauty itself. There is no problem with our love, but rather, with our misunderstanding of its purpose—it is a call to ascend and become beautiful by resting in God.

So what does this corrosion look like?

As the higher perfects the lower, so, too, does it disorder the lower if it falls into error. If there is no truth, to what does the noble soul aspire? Neither King David nor Prince Hector stepped into greatness because of an opinion. Men do not die for ambiguity. When the spirited part of the soul cools to its love of nobility, it no longer finds the strength to overcome hardship and achieve glory. The soul becomes soft and pusillanimous. It knows of no beauty worthy of sacrifice. Climbing the ladder of love is too hard. Thus acedia produces soft-souled men who not only hate the idea of greatness in themselves but hate it in others. These souls produce cultures of mediocrity that celebrate the lukewarm.

Many souls live the life of cattle. Without truth and nobility, the soul turns to what is left: pleasure. We live our lives with our heads down, as Socrates notes, never looking up to ascend toward greatness but down toward bestial pleasures. We are the worst animals when it comes to food and sex, as Aristotle notes. Acedia hands the soul over to lust and gluttony by depriving it of its love of higher beauties. Such an attempt to satiate the soul’s need for happiness through a glutting of the baser appetites only serves to further cool the soul toward its true pleasures. Eventually, what little warmth resides in the soul cools to all pleasure, and the soul loses its love of life itself. What results is a culture of death that dehumanizes and discards others.

So what can be done?

The antidote to acedia is zeal—a committed diligence of the soul pursuing beauty and becoming beautiful. Understanding the structure of the soul provides a map for self-examination. What do I seek most in life: God, truth, nobility, or pleasure? Have I allowed God to illuminate and arrange the lesser beauties in my life? Do I cultivate an intellectual life or has my pursuit of truth quietly cooled? Am I spirited and do I seek to be magnanimous, or have I grown comfortable in mediocrity? Do I moderate pleasure, or do I make my reason a slave to my lower appetites? Do I turn to the virtues to help perfect the parts of my soul, or has the impulse to beauty waned and tired?

At Front Porch Republic, in "Sore Mouth Pond,"  Micah Paul Veillon recounts the discovery of largemouth bass in an unassuming little body of water where he'd been led to believe he shouldn't expect to see them:

 . . . after my graduation from college, and before I moved away from home (with every intent to return), I spent all of last summer fishing. I fished public lakes and creeks and the faithful fishing holes of my childhood, but I also tried a pond unfamiliar to me.

Though that pond was owned by a dear family friend I have known all my life, it was a new pond. Built in 2019, few had the chance to cast on it before COVID struck. Then I went off to college and didn’t do much fishing.

But while the world was in a frenzy our family friend fished his new pond, belaboring the hours and the fish. What else was there to do? Men have long made excuses to get out on the water. None were needed during COVID. So he fished it until he was worn slap out.

He caught every bass in that pond five times over, too. Indeed, he fished it so often he decided to name it: Sore Mouth Pond. Faulkner himself could not have drawn up a better one.

The night before I went, my youngest brother asked me where I was off to in the morning. Upon revealing to him that I was headed to Sore Mouth Pond, he forewarned me:

If you want to catch catfish until you’re blue in the face, or bluegill as big as your shoe, then it’s a fine spot. But if you’re bass fishing then don’t go. You won’t catch nothing. I’ve been a couple times and so has Sam and we ain’t even felt a bite. 

I told him I was aware of the pond’s reputation but still planned on going and that he was welcome to join me. He said his one principle in life was not to get up at five a.m. for nothing—fair enough.


He then reflects on what Kierkegaard has to say about his situation:

When I arrived at the pond the next morning the sun had started to break. A hazy, silver blue peeked over the pines past the pond, and I could see the early morning orange at their trunks. I stepped out of my truck and could smell the afternoon’s coming rain. The air was heavy and sweet. There was an undressing, a nakedness for the nostrils on the breeze. I stopped and played with the smell for a second, breathing it in and out before I made my way downhill to the pond just beyond the apple trees. Chills went up my arms in spite of the scorching summer heat.

After three hours of fishing, no bass had been caught. I did catch a stunning little sunfish on a road runner crappie jig right as the sun had cleared the pines past the pond. He had blue streaks running up his jaw like he’d been struck by lightning. Color sizzled though him. It was beautiful. It looked an awful lot like the feeling in my jaw when I drink mint juleps too quickly.

I tried multiple different crappie jigs, assuming the bass were far too accustomed to normal bass jigs and chatter baits and whopper ploppers. I even threw around a pink rooster tail and caught three catfish on it, which is incredible. With every cast I was increasingly aware of what all I did not know and could not foresee.

I did not leave disappointed, though. Rather, I was hopeful; determined to return the next evening. I wanted to catch a bass, of course, and rather badly, but I also wished to see the fog settle on the pond silhouetted against a warm sky.

I went at half past six the next day, and after fishing for two hours I had yet to get a bite on a chatter bait or any of my crankbaits. Then the night began to settle, and the critters came out to praise it. To their cue, I tied on a yellow, black speckled top water frog with black and yellow stringed legs and a white belly. At the corner of the pond were tall, healthy sweet flags that the top water frog would fall into comfortably. I made my way there. On the third cast a bass rose and struck the frog forcefully and fast. But, out of impatience, I jerked my rod too quickly and yanked it from its mouth before the hooks could even separate from the frog.

I did not see another bite so I left as all went black, and I paid no attention to the fog.

When I made it home I wrestled with the thought of fishing Sore Mouth Pond again over my nightly cup of coffee. The chief problem was not that I was bored plum out of my mind—which I surely was—but that I was bored and I knew there were fish in there. I was not fishing in a puddle. I had spoken to the owner the week before, and he assured me of the fact. No doubt, he explained, the pond was worn and the fish were weary to bite; but they’re in there, he promised, and you can catch ‘em. 

I, however, was growing annoyed. Everything was so idle on that pond. There was no action. The silence, once peaceful, had become an agitation. I was doing everything I could to keep the boredom at bay, oscillating between all the different lures and jigs. Different colors and sizes and speeds and shapes. But there was the fact: two days of bass fishing on the pond had born no bass. The boring fact.

As a result, my mind was restless—which is probably why Kierkegaard labeled boredom as the root of all evil, and the subsequent restlessness as that which “keeps a person out of the world of spirit and puts them in a class with the animals.”

Indeed, I was turning to what Kierkegaard claimed men turn to to cure them of their boredom: activity and work, which seem to annul the boredom but ultimately manufacture anxious and fidgety men resembling “humming insects … the most boring of all.”

More and more I wanted to give up on Sore Mouth Pond. I wanted to just fish somewhere else. Kierkegaard, though, condemned me again: “Change is what all who are bored cry out for.” Men grow bored of the country and move to the city; bored of where they’re at so they travel abroad, maybe even move states or countries. Bored of silver? Try gold.

The change that Kierkegaard proposed to solve boredom, though, is not change in this way at all, but a rotation of sorts. A crop rotation, as he posited. Like farmers attached to a place, Kierkegaard believed the principal boredom-curing method is not in a moving away, or a radical changing of the soil, but in the rotation of grains in the same soil. A faithfulness to the place one is in. Underlying this for Kierkegaard is the principle of limitation, “the only saving one in the world.”

In this way, “idleness as such is by no means a root of evil; quite the contrary, it is a truly divine way of life so long as one is not bored.” One must go through the idleness when he feels boredom breathing down his neck. Fleeing it only begins the “infinite bad,” the ceaseless pursuit.

So I went to bed, resolving to go back to Sore Mouth Pond in the morning.

When I arrived the air was quiet. I could not sense if it was going to rain; it did not smell like it, but the sky was overcast, and the morning mist had yet to rise. I could not really see where I wanted to start fishing, but I knew the general direction. After walking for a minute I saw where the logs slipped into the water and went to cast there.

I decided to Texas rig a green Yamamoto Senko worm with red sand-like speckles. It’s a tried-and-true bass rig that I had assumed the bass had seen a million times. But my time on Sore Mouth Pond had already revealed all that I cannot predict. So I went with it.

I cast around the logs a few times before moving off slightly to the right, casting beyond the logs and far enough into the mist that I did not see the splash of the Senko worm. Before the second, slow revolving of my spin reel was complete the line pulsed with life like a vein with burning blood. My heart took off with the bass now firmly set on the hook. I let him run for a second and thanked God. I knew he wasn’t getting off.

He was a beautiful, two-and-a-half-pound largemouth bass with yellow ribs and green checkers falling to his tail so dark they were almost black, caught on the most standard of bass rigs I had been refusing to use the whole time. Despite my stubbornness, fidelity bore its fruit.

I held the bass, inspecting him for a minute and then placed him softly back into the water by the tail. I waved it from side to side a few times to return the breath he gave to me. The mud in the shallow of the pond billowed up like smoke, then he slipped out of my hand and slowly swam into the mist and everything was still again.

Christopher Yates's essay "Sorting the Self: Assessments and the Cult of Personality" at Hedgehog Review looks at humankind's fascination with quantifying and classifying the inner self.

It's not new, as he points out:

Some six centuries before the term personality became the coin of the modern humanistic realm, aptitudinal assessment programs found a toehold in China under the direction of civil service recruitment efforts. The individual became an object of attention, at least in the sense of his functional potential. By the time of the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD), skill-focused testing and selection measures were on a firm footing, later approaching national use during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Then things set sail. 

In 1832, the English East India Company employed assessments in the selection of personnel for overseas duty, a practice that led to the British Civil Service’s initiation of such testing in 1885. In 1883, the US Civil Service Commission was vested with responsibility for administering numerous aptitudinal examinations relevant to government work.9 During World War I, Columbia University psychologist Robert S. Woodworth began developing the Woodworth Personal Data Sheet for use by the US Army to sift out panic-prone soldiers. After Germany’s defeat in that war, the German High Command “established a program for the assessment and selection of officers and specialists that was of unprecedented proportions,” ambitiously seeking to interpret the “total person.”10 The US government would go on to stitch comprehensive assessment examinations into the fiber of the War Officer Selection Boards starting in 1943.11 Increasingly psychologically informed and questionnaire based, the aptitudinal trajectory was principally concerned with what we call personality as a matter of fine-tuning job placement for the sake of building state power and winning wars. At the same time, such pragmatism was nested within a much larger transition in the Western conception of the self, the full significance of which was not yet apparent. What the adoption of Woodworth’s instrument reflected was a slight tilt in civic managerialism away from what historian Warren Susman calls the “culture of character” and toward a new “culture of personality” (my emphases).12 I say “slight” because the aptitudinal developments just noted had one foot on the character side and the other on the personality side. In the American milieu especially, the duty to serve was partly derived from the nineteenth century’s understanding of “character” as those aspects of a citizen that promoted the health of the societal order. The worth and meaning of the self were measured (not entirely, but significantly and intuitively) in terms of how well one embodied “a standard of conduct that assured the interrelationship between the ‘social’ and the ‘moral’” in their own localized and/or institutionalized ways.13 In short, personhood was understood in terms of duty, and duty lay in the application of virtues. 


And then in the twentieth century, industrial psychology came into its own:

Some six centuries before the term personality became the coin of the modern humanistic realm, aptitudinal assessment programs found a toehold in China under the direction of civil service recruitment efforts. The individual became an object of attention, at least in the sense of his functional potential. By the time of the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD), skill-focused testing and selection measures were on a firm footing, later approaching national use during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Then things set sail. 

In 1832, the English East India Company employed assessments in the selection of personnel for overseas duty, a practice that led to the British Civil Service’s initiation of such testing in 1885. In 1883, the US Civil Service Commission was vested with responsibility for administering numerous aptitudinal examinations relevant to government work.9 During World War I, Columbia University psychologist Robert S. Woodworth began developing the Woodworth Personal Data Sheet for use by the US Army to sift out panic-prone soldiers. After Germany’s defeat in that war, the German High Command “established a program for the assessment and selection of officers and specialists that was of unprecedented proportions,” ambitiously seeking to interpret the “total person.”10 The US government would go on to stitch comprehensive assessment examinations into the fiber of the War Officer Selection Boards starting in 1943.11 Increasingly psychologically informed and questionnaire based, the aptitudinal trajectory was principally concerned with what we call personality as a matter of fine-tuning job placement for the sake of building state power and winning wars. At the same time, such pragmatism was nested within a much larger transition in the Western conception of the self, the full significance of which was not yet apparent. What the adoption of Woodworth’s instrument reflected was a slight tilt in civic managerialism away from what historian Warren Susman calls the “culture of character” and toward a new “culture of personality” (my emphases).12 I say “slight” because the aptitudinal developments just noted had one foot on the character side and the other on the personality side. In the American milieu especially, the duty to serve was partly derived from the nineteenth century’s understanding of “character” as those aspects of a citizen that promoted the health of the societal order. The worth and meaning of the self were measured (not entirely, but significantly and intuitively) in terms of how well one embodied “a standard of conduct that assured the interrelationship between the ‘social’ and the ‘moral’” in their own localized and/or institutionalized ways.13 In short, personhood was understood in terms of duty, and duty lay in the application of virtues. 

At the American Enterprise Institute's website, husband-and-wife education-research team Benjamin Storey and Jenna Silber Storey alert us to an encouraging well-looky-there phenomenon: the possibility of a humanities revival in education:

For the first time in decades, certain parts of the long-suffering humanities are a growth sector in higher ed. Even more surprisingly, this expansion is being driven by state legislatures and governing boards dominated by Republicans.

At public colleges in red and purple states like Arizona, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah, about 200 tenure- and career-track faculty lines are being created in new academic units devoted to civic education, according to Paul Carrese, founding director of the School of Civic and Economic Thought and Leadership (SCETL) at Arizona State University. These positions are being filled by faculty members trained in areas including political theory, history, philosophy, classics, and English. Since there are only about 2,000 jobs advertised in all those disciplines combined in a typical year, the creation of 200 new lines is a significant event.

Because a political party intensely critical of higher education has backed the founding of those programs, some worry that they will debase academic standards, subject intellectual life to political imperatives, and constrain teaching within certain ideological limits. Others hope that this burst of hiring might help colleges better prepare students for civic life and rebuild interest in the humanities.

Criticism of these new programs is both understandable and premature. Most of them have just been founded and have yet to demonstrate exactly how they intend to fulfill the mandates that have set them in motion. They have not had time to create a track record by which they might be judged, and they will each develop in different ways. For now, understanding the motivations of the faculty members who join them may be the best way to discern where those programs are headed. Who are the academics working in these programs? Why have they moved from other colleges? How do they think about their responsibility to the legislative mandates that created these projects? And how do they plan to build academic programs with integrity under intense and conflicting political pressures, from both on and off campus?

The Storeys wisely caution those spearheading this move to avoid its politicization. 

At The National Interest, Bruce W. Bennett observes that, probably unwisely, The United States has acquiesced to the existence of a nuclear North Korea, and then says that if that is the case, everything possible must be done to minimize its threat:

While the U.S. government still seeks North Korean denuclearization, senior U.S. personnel have recently argued that the United States is prepared to negotiate interim steps to achieve that objective. Which is to say that the U.S. government believes that it can live with North Korean nuclear weapons for some significant period of time.

And that is very risky for many reasons. If Kim had only five to ten nuclear weapons and a very stable country, that would be one thing. But Kim already likely has fifty to 100 nuclear weapons or so, and he appears to be shooting to produce hundreds at an exponentially increasing rate.

North Korea’s instability and growing nuclear weapon inventory could embolden him to carry out limited conventional force attacks on the South and perhaps even nuclear attacks. That could put the United States in a difficult position because any military response to such provocations could escalate to full nuclear weapon employment by North Korea. Kim might hope that this “nuclear shadow” effect would undercut the South Korea-U.S. alliance, one of his key objectives.

While the South Korean president, Yoon Suk Yeol, has been stern in threatening serious retaliation against North Korean attacks, the United States has sought to avoid any kind of military escalation on the Korean Peninsula. The United States clearly worries that Kim has threatened to annihilate South Korea or at the very least conquer and annex it. Once a military conflict begins, the United States may not be able to control the subsequent escalation.

North Korean instability would also factor into Kim’s behavior. This instability might increase Kim’s use of provocations to divert the North Koreans from their miserable living circumstances. And he may hope that South Korea will respond to a limited North Korean conventional attack with an escalation that demonstrates to the North Korean people that the South really is the enemy of the North. Kim could then appear justified in the North for blaming various regime failures on the South as the regime’s main enemy. This also would confirm Kim’s renunciation of negotiated unification because the South is such an enemy.

Bracing stuff.

I've been busy over at Precipice.

My latest, "But Then We'll Be Alright, Won't We?" says that, for all the focus this week on Biden's obvious senility, it's really just

. . .  a symptom of our nation’s flatlining spiritual health. There are layers and layers of symptoms that are outward expressions of the actual cause of our dire circumstances.

"Developing A Sense of Smell" takes the 1980s fans of Latin American radicals such as the Sandinistas to task for their role in what  has now been wrought: a scheme cooked up by Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba to give bad actors from around the world flights into Managua, so as to facilitate their entry into the barely-existent US southern border.

"Once Again, The 2020s Right Attempts To Make A Perfectly Valid Point In the Most Boneheaded, Ineffective Way Possible" discusses Louisiana's new Ten-Commandments-in-every-classroom law.

"The Two-Edged Sword That Is Modernity" asserts that the West is exhausted from all the advancement it's achieved over the last 200 years. 

There. That ought to keep you out of trouble this weekend.



 


 

 

 

Friday, May 17, 2024

Friday roundup

 Glenn Harlan Reynolds has a thought-provoking take on the Harrison Butker dustup at Instapundit:

Speaking to a graduation crowd at conservative Catholic Benedictine College in Atchison, Kansas, Butker took on Joe Biden’s performative faux-Catholicism, transgender ideology and – most shockingly – suggested to female graduates that they would find a better, more rewarding, and more productive life as wives and mothers than in corporate-style careers.

For this, he received a standing ovation from the crowd. (The full speech is here.)  The wider world, however, was not so appreciative. . . 

Unlike Harrison Butker, I’m not holding myself out as a role model here.  When I married Helen she was finishing her Ph.D., and I don’t think I ever had a single serious girlfriend who wanted to be a stay-at-home mom.  (And we only had one – terrific – kid, though we in fact wanted to, and tried to, have two or three, something that alas wasn’t in the cards.)

But what I want or favor isn’t the point here.  The point is that the population collapse that I was writing about nearly 20 years ago, and that Philip Longman was writing about in Foreign Affairs even before that, has now become obvious to everyone.  We’re headed for the biggest global population drop since the Black Death, and that’s going to produce dramatic social changes.  (As indeed did the Black Death.)

The future does belong to those who show up, and those who show up are likely to have the attitudes that caused them to do so.  So is Harrison Butker a harbinger?  Quite probably.

At Public Discourse, Nathaniel Peters asks "Why Should a Christian Study the Humanities?"   He offers several reasons, including this one:

. . . to cultivate a disposition of wonder, thanksgiving, and praise. These are the proper responses of rational creatures to the creator God. We should study so that when we encounter an equation or sculpture of great beauty, or an exquisitely crafted sentence, our response is one of praise or thanksgiving. So often in the academy, we’re trained to critique, to put ourselves over another author or book or work and make judgments from a position of superiority. This is necessary at times, but when it becomes our default, it can keep us from enjoying a work and allowing it to move us. A properly Christian kind of study leaves room for that vulnerability and enjoyment, for cultivating wonder and praise. After all, praise of God is at its heart restating the truth about who God is and what he has done. Study of the truth should lead to richer, more sustained praise.

"Two Reflections On the State of the Soul" by Darren Jonescu is good stuff:

Nothing is sadder than a profound statement reduced to popular cliché. “The unexamined life is not worth living” spouted by a million undifferentiated graduate students, as if “the examined life” were the simplest thing on earth, rather than Socrates’ final statement of defiance to a world he believed largely incapable of taking up the challenge. “What does not kill me makes me stronger” issuing from the lips of every infantile adult facing the abyss of a break-up after a two-month sexual relationship, or every student who suffers the indignity of a B grade on a test. Such reduction indicates the stifling of a liberating idea by a method far more complete and effective than the mere refusal to listen, namely by the absorption and normalization of the shocking and strange within the unobtrusive soundscape of comforting truisms, the voice of the rousing gadfly transformed into a soothing lullaby. Socrates warned that the voice of reason could not be heard amid the crowd. But his warning was less a lament than an enticement to the alternative setting, the realm of private conversation or quiet contemplation. When that realm itself has been conquered and converted into just another subsection of the popular space — when the language of wisdom has been reduced by the dynamic compression of technological democratization into just another shade in the general array of lifeless colors — then Socrates’ ironic stand against the chatter of the crowd, or Nietzsche’s brave acceptance of his spiritual agony before mankind’s approaching nihilism, become superficial routines, and the world, in turn, becomes an infinitely darker place.

At Firebrand, Rachel L. Coleman looks deeply into the significance of story, of narrative:

our Story is the story of the God who works redemptively in history, and it is centered upon the person and work of King Jesus. As Nijay Gupta (2024) puts it, “The crucified Christ is the vivifying center of our Story” (Galatians, 2). We are invited into this grand Story not just as readers but also as participants, equipped by the Spirit of God to join God in his redemptive work. Think of how many of the significant smaller narratives that make up the Story have open endings—Jonah, Mark’s Gospel, Acts. The very design invites us to step in and “complete,” as it were, the narrative.

The urgency of this is that we all, both as individuals and as communities, are shaped by a Story (big S), and if it is not the grand Narrative of Scripture, there will be other big Stories that usurp its formative and transformative role. These Stories are alternative ways of answering the fundamental questions human beings ask, and they can be so subtly and deeply woven into the generational and ideological fabric of our communities that we are not even aware of their controlling power. N.T. Wright and Michael Bird (2024), in a chilling phrase, call these alternative Stories “idolatries too large to be noticed by those who hold them” (Jesus and the Powers, 100). Their keen insight is a flashing yellow light for the church, calling us to the difficult and vulnerable work of examining our controlling narratives.

Wesleyan scholar Ken Collins calls this phenomenon “narrative displacement” or “narrative drift,” the shoving aside of the biblical Story by another controlling narrative. When this happens in our communities of faith, consciously or otherwise, the result is that we no longer interpret the world through the lens of the Story of Scripture; instead we read Scripture through the lens of whatever narrative has displaced the biblical Story. The results of this narrative drift are catastrophic for both discipleship and mission. As far back as 2008, Australian sociologist John Carroll painted a stark picture of the consequences, which have become ever more visible in the intervening years. As an outsider (not a professing Christian) looking at the decline of the church in the West, Carroll diagnosed the root problem as the church’s amnesia about its Story: “The Christian churches have comprehensively failed in their one central task—to retell their foundational story in a way that might speak to the times” (The Existential Jesus, 7). I encourage you to read that line again, allowing its gravity to sink deeply into your mind and heart. This Story-telling failure stands in sharp contrast to what we see in the pages of the New Testament.. As Wright and Bird put it:

Paul [and this could be said of all the apostles] was not a travelling evangelist, offering people a new religious experience, but an ambassador for a king-in-waiting, establishing cells of people loyal to this new king, and ordering their lives according to his story, his symbols and his praxis, and their minds according to his truth (21, emphasis added).

This would be a good point for each reader to do some clear-eyed diagnostic work, preferably in the company of trusted brothers and sisters. Can you identify the competing big Story (or Stories) that usurp the place and power of the biblical Story in the minds and hearts of your community of faith? What are those stories? Where do they come from? How are they shaping the beliefs, thinking, attitudes, and actions of people in your church and community? 


Ben Sears's weekly "POETS Day!" installment at Ordinary Times always provides fresh insights into the greatest craftspersons of that particular kind of writing.  Today he looks at Philip Larkin:

n the introduction to Philip Larkin: Poems Selected by Martin Amis, Amis writes of the poet, “Larkin is not a poet’s poet. He is of course a people’s poet, which is what he would have wanted. But he is also, definingly, a novelist’s poet.”

Larkin had a knack for evocative images. In a tight phrase, he could suggest a lifetime. The above poem, “Afternoons”, has one of what I consider the best examples with “And the albums, lettered/Our Wedding, lying/Near the television.” Like in the shortest story often attributed to Hemingway, “Baby shoes, for sale, never worn,” loose details leave much to us. It’s slight of hand, a storyteller’s trick, because when we give flesh to the tale we’ll do so with scenes that already resonate with us. There’s little risk in not relating to a reader that makes his own conveying connection. The talent is in knowing how to spur us to imagining. Larkin knew how.

He gives us a destination and a starting point and we don’t know the interim, but we do. There’s a couple that was full of hope and expectation, indulging in possibility, frozen and bound in a flash. What would be a cherished heirloom under different circumstances shares space with a box for watching other people’s lives. Captured images on the tv screen and in the book are a fantasy; unreal. It doesn’t matter what circumstances relegated the wedding album. There’s room for all manner of possibilities because it isn’t the story of one couple. There’s “An estateful.”

Amis highlights “mugfaced middleaged wives/Glaring at jellies” from “Show Saturday.” I know those women, and I suspect you do too. Larkin is brilliantly acerbic. He cuts cruelly because he cuts directly when mockingly describing habits and rituals of life he finds silly or undignified. When that insight is used to address his own shortcomings and failings, resulting circumstances, and his attempts to cope with them he’s often resigned and bitter.

Finally, I've been busy over at Precipice. A few recents:

 

What My Day Was Like the Day of the OJ Verdict folds the looming death of my beloved dog, ten hours of establishing a working relationship with a photographer with whom I'd been paired on a magazine assignment, watching the OJ verdict with a crowd in the lobby of the Circle Theater in downtown Indianapolis, witnessing, quite by surprise, a summit of two great jazz musicians, and much more.

On April 25, I looked at the consequences of Extolling Amnesia as a Virtue:

f the notion that the human being can define - indeed, invent - himself or herself continues to prevail, the most feral kind of defined self will be the one that holds sway. This will occur because self-defense in a state of lawlessness will return us to pre-human behavior such as traveling in packs and disregard for any kind of rules when it comes to such basics as obtaining food and a warm place to sleep. We’re already seeing some of the traveling-in-packs phenomenon with the degree to which militant identity politics has permeated everything.

In Friendship, I look at how our notions of what that term means change throughout the seasons of our lives. 

It looks to be a hammock kind of weekend. You now have an abundance of reading material for the occasion. 

 

 

 

 


Tuesday, December 1, 2020

Tuesday roundup

 I don't know how politically feasible this would be, but from a procedural standpoint, it would do the trick, it seems to me. Steve Milloy, writing at the Wall Street Journal, outlines the way the Senate - as currently composed - could keep the incoming Biden administration from re-imposong the Paris climate accord:

To prevent the Paris Climate Accord from taking on . . .  undue power [due to a Supreme Court decision similar to the way the rescinding of the DACA program was undone], Mr. Trump should submit it to the Senate, and Majority Leader Mitch McConnell should schedule a quick vote. It would certainly be rejected—ratification requires a two-thirds vote—and it is unlikely any court could subsequently resurrect a legislatively tossed treaty. Without the help of judges, Mr. Biden would need a winning ratification vote to make the accord binding, which he likely couldn’t get no matter how well Democrats do in Georgia’s January runoffs and the 2022 midterm elections. 

Mr. McConnell could also call a ratification vote after Mr. Biden’s inauguration, even if Mr. Trump does nothing. This would similarly elevate the treaty’s status and make it difficult for Mr. Biden to bind his successors to his executive actions.

I think there would be enough Senators with thinking at least somewhat along the lines of Joe Manchin that a Senate vote would yield the result depicted by Milloy: 

West Virginia Sen. Joe Manchin, a Democrat, hit back at Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez after being the subject of a viral tweet by the Democratic socialist last month, telling The New York Times that she’s “more active on Twitter than anything else.”

At the time, Manchin vowed to stand up against the radicals in his party, particularly on the subject of defunding the police.

“Defund the police? Defund, my butt,” he tweeted. “I'm a proud West Virginia Democrat. We are the party of working men and women. We want to protect Americans' jobs & healthcare. We do not have some crazy socialist agenda, and we do not believe in defunding the police.”

He elaborated:

The senator continued: “We’re not going to defund the police, we’re not for the new green deal. That’s not going to happen. We’re not for Medicare for All — we can’t even pay for Medicare for some.”

Mary Townsend, writing at Plough, explores the influence of Louisa May Alcott on French existentialist Simone de Beauvoir: 

Born in 1908, Beauvoir grew up in the thick emotive haze of leftover nineteenth-century French Catholicism, carried into pre-war France. She was educated in the same sort of immersive religiosity that provided plenty of opportunities for spiritual heroism from very young girls in particular, the same sort of upbringing that produced Saint Thérèse of Lisieux, the Little Flower, who aspired to sainthood from her very early youth and in her death in 1897. Beauvoir, who for several years aspired to be a nun, writes of the exquisite transports of confessional tears, imagining herself swooning in the arms of angels; she prided herself on inventing mortifications in her very few moments alone. But unlike Thérèse, Beauvoir found no lasting comfort within or even distantly alongside Christianity.

It was not by cutting herself off from transports of emotion or by abandoning the metaphysical all-or-nothing that she eventually found an image of adulthood she could live with; nor could the attractions of philosophy, which she first came across through the Thomism of her girls’ school, or the Catholic social justice group she volunteered for, do the trick. It was rather literature, as a kind of Art, and herself as Author, that managed to hold the strongest and most sustainable appeal as vocation. If you can believe it, the first non-saintly individual Beauvoir found really attractive was the fictional American Protestant, Jo March, one of the heroines of Louisa May Alcott’s wildly popular 1868 novel, Little Women. Beauvoir couldn’t quite escape the nineteenth century after all.

Like so many readers, the young Simone was passionately invested in the persona of Jo as a writer, taking up the genre of the short story to imitate her. Inevitably, she also had extremely strong opinions on the Laurie question, the wealthy neighbor who proposes to one and then another of the March sisters. Opening the second volume Good Wives by accident, she came upon Laurie and Amy’s engagement (without the help of Jo’s refusal for context), and her response was immediate and absolute: “I hated Louisa M. Alcott for it.” But the similarities between the Marches’ style of family life (fictionalized from Alcott’s own experience) and her own gave her pleasure: “they were taught, as I was, that a cultivated mind and moral righteousness was better than money.” This was something to hold on to, the more so because like the Marches, and like Alcott herself, Beauvoir’s family dealt with straitened means, the memory of better times, and the all-too-visible wealth and comfort of neighbors and relations. The reward of their virtue was to be found in the causes they took up: for Alcott, abolitionism and suffrage, and for Beauvoir, existentialism, Marxism, and her own variety of existentialist Marxist feminism. The necessity for strict social circumspection in the behavior of daughters was lost on Simone, Louisa, and Jo alike.

How did de Beauvoir wind up with the philosophical stance that she did?

I think Beauvoir settled on atheism because she was unable to imagine an intellectual Christianity. This was not because intellectualism was lacking from the Thomism or Catholic existentialism that she had come across, but because what she wanted was the freedom of a Christian, the freedom to understand God, truth, the Absolute on her own terms, and she was told that there was no way to do this. There’s an irony in her captivation with Sartre’s vision, which she found novel, of the freedom to will one’s own future – all too strangely reminiscent of the argument Luther made in 1520. For Beauvoir, the blind nationalism of the French Catholic church, its triumphal support of colonization, its unwillingness to call private property into question, failed to answer her desire for understanding a world in thrall to capitalism. One must think of Beauvoir as a rebel angel.


 

Matthew Continetti, writing at the American Enterprise Institute website, reminds us what a remarkable human being Natan Sharansky is:

Sharansky was born in 1948 in the Ukrainian city of Stalino. His given name was Anatoly. His parents were educated professionals who downplayed their Jewish identity. They did not want to risk political and social reprisal. “The only real Jewish experience I had was facing anti-Semitism,” he writes. The precocious youth spent his early years playing chess. He learned to navigate a Soviet system that maintained its rule through fear. He became captive to doublethink. He repeated official lies and myths not because it was the right thing to do, but because it was the safe thing to do.

Sharansky enrolled in the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. “I dived into the republic of science,” he writes. “This world seemed insulated from the doublethink I had mastered at home.” Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War prompted him to discover his heritage. “Realizing how little I knew about this country that so many people were now asking about made me hungry to learn more.”

Sharansky studied representations of Biblical scenes hanging from the walls of Moscow’s galleries. He came across a samizdat copy of Leon Uris’s Exodus, a potboiler historical fiction that describes Israel’s founding. “It drew me into Jewish history, and Israel’s history, through my Russian roots. It helped me see myself as part of the story.”

The following year the Soviet nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov wrote his “Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom.” Sakharov argued for freedom of inquiry. He demanded the protection of human rights. “Sakharov was warning that life in a dictatorship offers two choices: either you overcome your fear and stand for truth, or you remain a slave to fear, no matter how fancy your titles, no matter how big your dacha,” Sharansky writes. “Ultimately, I couldn’t escape myself or my conscience.”

Inspired by Sakharov, Sharansky applied for a visa to immigrate to Israel in 1973. He was rejected. He was unable to leave the Soviet Union. That made him a refusenik. “My life as a doublethinker, which I had consciously begun at age five the day Stalin died, was over. The professional world I had built for myself, my castle of science, collapsed instantly. Now, I could say what I thought, do what I said, and say what I did.”

The twin concerns of Sharansky’s life—identity and freedom—became fused. “Democracy—a free life in a free society—is essential because it satisfies a human yearning to choose one’s path, to pursue one’s goals,” he wrote in Defending Identity. “It broadens possibilities and provides opportunity for self-advancement. Identity, a life of commitment, is essential because it satisfies a human longing to become part of something bigger than oneself. It adds layers of meaning to our lives and deepens the human experience.” Freedom offers choice. Identity provides direction.

It would be a while before Sharansky could enjoy his own freedom. By 1975, he was working with Sakharov. The next year he formed the Moscow Helsinki Group to pressure the Soviets to live up to the commitments they had made in basket three of the Helsinki Accords. The KGB arrested him in 1977. “I spent the next nine years in prison and labor camp,” he wrote in Fear No Evil, “mainly on a special disciplinary regime, including more than 400 days in punishment cells, and more than 200 days on hunger strikes.”

In prison he played chess games in his head. “I always won.” He would tease the guards with anti-Soviet jokes. He was not afraid. What could they do—put him in jail? He communicated with his fellow inmates through morse code. They would drain the toilets and speak to one another through pipes. He read Soviet propaganda esoterically, between the lines. He figured out what was actually going on by determining what the authorities had omitted.

Sharansky was in prison when he heard that President Ronald Reagan had called the Soviet Union the “Evil Empire.” The year was 1983. Reagan had uttered the famous—and controversial—words in a speech to the National Association of Evangelicals. “It was one of the most important, freedom-affirming declarations, and we all instantly knew it,” Sharansky said in a 2004 interview. “For us, that was the moment that really marked the end for them, and the beginning for us. The lie had been exposed and could never, ever be untold now. This was the end of Lenin’s ‘Great October Bolshevik Revolution’ and the beginning of a new revolution, a freedom revolution—Reagan’s Revolution.”

Sharansky and his wife Avital had been apart since her immigration to Israel the day after they married in 1974. Throughout his imprisonment she worked tirelessly on his behalf, and on behalf of other refuseniks and dissidents. She found an ally in Israel’s U.N. ambassador, Benjamin Netanyahu. She met with Reagan, who began asking Soviet leaders to release Sharansky. Gorbachev freed him on February 11, 1986. He was reunited with Avital in Frankfurt Airport. They flew to Israel. “‘It was just one long day,’ Avital sighed later that night, in our new home in Jerusalem. ‘I arrived in Israel in the morning. You arrived in the evening. It was just one very, very long day in between.’”

He became Natan. He entered Israeli politics. He helped resettle one million immigrants from the former Soviet Union. He opposed the Oslo peace accords. He resigned from Ariel Sharon’s government over the policy of unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. His work as an activist was devoted to building what Reagan had described as “the infrastructure of democracy.” Sharansky distinguished between free societies and fear societies. “The structural elements that enable democratic societies to respect human rights—independent courts, the rule of law, a free press, a freely elected government, meaningful opposition parties, not to mention human rights organizations—were all glaringly absent in fear societies,” he wrote in The Case for Democracy (2004).

This utterance from Joseph diGenova may be the most disturbing example of Trumpism denial of the election results yet:

On Monday President Trump’s campaign lawyer and former U.S. Attorney Joe diGenova said that fired Trump cybersecurity chief Chris Krebs should be executed for saying that the election was the “most secure in United States history.”

DiGenova, appearing on the Howie Carr show, which simulcasts on Newsmax, took aim at Krebs as an aside during a wheels-off segment full of false claims about how the United States election had been rigged.

“Anybody who thinks that this election went well, like that idiot Krebs who used to be the head of cybersecurity [for Trump]. That guy is a class A moron. He should be drawn and quartered. Taken out at dawn and shot,” diGenova said.

This is not just a random Parler troll trying to get attention. This is an attorney speaking on behalf of the President of the United States’ re-election campaign. And while it may read like a macabre joke, the direct nature of diGenova’s comments make it impossible to interpret as anything other than a real wish/threat against a public servant for offering truthful testimony.

Carr responded to the statement with an awkward pause and a laugh and then changed the subject. Some shit is so weird that it even makes Newsmax people uncomfortable.

Matt Walsh at Daily Wire on the absurdity of making Sarah Fuller's field goal attempt for Vanderbilt into a historic occasion:

 On Saturday, Sarah Fuller became the first woman to suit up and take the field for a Power-5 football team. The media has declared Fuller’s performance as Vanderbilt’s kicker a groundbreaking, glass ceiling shattering, historic moment. Many in media and the sports world echoed Hillary Clinton’s sentiment that Fuller proved “women and girls belong on every playing field—quite literally.” In a game of escalating hyperbole, ESPN eventually claimed victory by declaring that Fuller has achieved “immortality” through her play in Vanderbilt’s game against Missouri.

Admittedly, she was spectacular. Fuller went 5 for 5 on field goals, booted 3 touchbacks past the end zone, and even made a game saving tackle as the clock expired in regulation. Just kidding. Actually, she kicked one time, it went 30 yards, Vanderbilt lost 41 to zero, and the head coach was fired after the game. This is reality, not a movie. And in real life, women embarrass themselves when they try to play against male athletes.

Walsh says that a clear-eyed view of the situation reveals how insulting the adulation is for women:

All of this patronizing nonsense surrounding a bad kick from a woman whose ego perhaps exceeds her abilities on the football field is merely annoying for me as a man. For women, though, it is much worse than annoying. It is patronizing, degrading, and insulting.  Are women really so unimpressive and bereft of achievement that we have to treat them like we would a small child who draws a bunch of scribbles on a sheet of construction paper and claims that it’s a picture of a tree? We congratulate the small child for his bad drawing because we do not expect children to do any better than that, and because they are emotionally fragile and in need of constant positive affirmation. Is this the case for grown women? Must we stand and applaud and shout “great kick” when, in truth, it was a very bad kick? Are women so pathetic that we have to call even their failures achievements? Not just achievements — but historic achievements? Is that how sad and mediocre women are, that we must stoop to this?

Answer: no. That’s how sad and mediocre feminists think women are, and perhaps are themselves. But it’s not the reality, and it’s not what I think or what any rational person thinks. Women are capable of extraordinary things in many facets of life. They also are capable of extraordinary things in the realm of athletics. Simone Biles comes immediately to mind. But women cannot compete with men in sports designed by and for men. 

Samuel Goldman, writing at Law & Liberty, says that how we define liberty is going to determine how we can defend it:

 iberty is plural, not singular. Rather than a gross concept outside history, institutions, or social structures, it is a “relational claim involving agents, actions, legitimacy, and ends.” To speak coherently, we need to specify the freedom of whom, to do what, under which rules, and for what purposes. The freedom of Socrates to philosophize is not the same as the freedom of Atheniansto participate in ruling and being ruled. Neither bears much resemblance to the liberty of a Christian described by Martin Luther.

Which liberties require defense? In the spirit of unfashionable opinion, I want to suggest that the answer can be described as the liberties of the modern West.

Scott Atlas has resigned his position as special advisor to the president on the pandemic.