The geostrategic vulnerability of post-America

Jerry Hendrix, writing at NRO,  has his personal account of attending this year's Reagan National Defense Forum at the Reagan library in Simi Valley, California. His overall set of observations just reinforces my notion that it would be supremely cool to attend that gathering some day. Panel discussions and speakers of the highest caliber.

He ends on somewhat of a downer, though. This nation is not adequately prepared for the world in which it's situated:

Budgets and force readiness were the dual themes that ran throughout the day. Everyone, except Representative Adam Smith (D., Calif.), bemoaned Congress’s inability to overturn the 2011 Budget Control Act. Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer observed that the nearly endless string of continuing resolutions that has characterized the post–Budget Control Act era had cost the Navy and Marine Corps over $4 billion in stop-and-start expenses. Despite a broad consensus among attendees, it was clear that internal disputes with “fiscal hawks” who viewed rising deficits as significant national-security threats in and of themselves were going to block any Republican attempts to do away with the Budget Control Act in the near future. There was a palpable sense of frustration in the room, especially among the Republican members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Despite having a Republican president who wants a larger military, and majorities in the House and the Senate, there was no real sense of energy or forward movement on strengthening the nation’s defense.

Force readiness was the other bogeyman in the room, with speakers from McMaster to former Obama appointee Kathleen Hicks highlighting the need to invest in readiness and modernization. Readiness and modernization, the latter in the form of investments in new “offsetting” capabilities, seem to represent the major hurdles that the Department of Defense needs to clear before it can begin to grow the force. Both seem to suggest false choices, as no real dollar amount has been advanced to answer the question of how much it would cost to achieve high “readiness,” and investments in modernization can coexist with investments in growing the force by following a traditional acquisition strategy consisting of a “high-low” mix. The desire by some to pursue only those high-end capabilities that are viewed as essential to winning the next great-power war carries with it the potential to diminish the day-to-day force that is critical to preserving the peace.

In the end, this year’s Reagan National Defense Forum highlighted the fact that the new administration, despite some irregularities in its strategic messaging, is attempting to reverse the passive strategic course of the past and to chart once again a more assertive role both both here on earth and out in space. However, problems within the legislative budgetary process are threatening to hamper these efforts and could further erode the United States’ position on the global stage. Lastly, there was a general sense of ennui throughout the Forum, a persistent intrusion of the overused boilerplate answers to longstanding problems in various panels, and few conversations containing innovative ideas or an energetic sense of forward motion. Actors within the defense community, and even within the Republican party itself, still seem pitted against each other. At the end of the day, as I stood next to Ronald Reagan’s grave while the sun set behind the western foothills he loved, I came away with the sense that somehow the nation’s defense community was beset by challenges and had accepted just standing still. Reagan would not be pleased.

Gary J. Schmitt of the American Enterprise Institute, writing at The Weekly Standard, echoes the theme:

Expectations among those serving in the military were that Trump’s plans were Reaganesque in scope.

Yet when President Trump put forward his first budget in March for the 2018 fiscal year, it was anything but. The administration’s budget called for only a 3 percent increase over Obama’s plans for 2018. It was nowhere near the levels required for beginning the defense build-up touted by candidate Trump and, indeed, was more than $100 billion short of what the bipartisan National Defense Panel, co-chaired by William Perry and John Abizaid, had recommended as necessary to match America’s means with its strategic goals.

Why is this the case? Budget stalemate. Various factions can't abide by cuts elsewhere that would "offset" an increase in military spending.

The upshot is that we're instilling a false sense of confidence in those on the front lines of the defense of our nation:

What’s worrisome is not only that when it comes to goals like deterring Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran and defeating Islamist terrorism we’re betting with (military) chips we don’t have, but that we keep telling the men and women of the military that help is on the way when it isn’t. If the nation wants an all-volunteer force that excels at doing its job in all kinds of godforsaken lands, it can’t continue to have its elected officials overlook the state of the military. Going in harm’s way is one thing; going in harm’s way repeatedly with equipment and platforms worn thin by age and use is something else entirely. That experienced pilots, sailors, and soldiers have begun to walk is no surprise given the promises made and the promises not kept by Congress and their commander in chief.

Perhaps if the world were a little less volatile right now, this would be merely concerning rather than flat-out alarming.