Kenneth Pollack of the American Enterprise Institute has an interesting perspective on the agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates to establish diplomatic relations. Pollack sees it as the codification of a bond that had been growing for some time.
He says that Israel's agreement not to annex any more West Bank territory at this time is really not such a huge sacrifice:
The proximate cause for Abu Dhabi’s decision may very well have been a (smart) deal with Jerusalem: recognition instead of annexation. Israel would refrain from annexing any West Bank territory in return for normalization of relations with the UAE.
This wasn’t as big a lift for either side as it might have been at previous times. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces serious domestic challenges at home, in particular over his government’s handling of the pandemic, and is beholden to coalition partners who believe that annexation would be a mistake. Thus, it would have been hard for Bibi to push forward on annexation regardless. Agreeing not to do what he probably couldn’t in return for recognition by another Arab state was therefore a win-win for him.
And everybody in the region knew that the two countries were growing more aligned:
Meanwhile, the UAE has been forging better relations with Israel for years. This was mostly kept private, even covert, but it was one of the worst kept secrets in a region of badly kept secrets. Moreover, it was pretty clear that the Emiratis were not unhappy with people knowing what they were up to, just as long as they retained some plausible deniability.
Pollack says that, for all the seeming difference between Obama-era US policy toward the Mideast and that of the Trump administration, it's really not all that much. Yes, the US has pulled out of the JCPOA and moved its embassy in Israel, but then it seems like the Very Stable Genius got bored with focusing on the region:
The deeper cause for this shift lies in America’s disengagement from the Middle East. This began under President Obama, and our Middle East allies hated it but hoped that it was an aberration. They looked forward to Obama’s departure from the White House in expectation that the next president would return to America’s traditional approach to the region.
They were deeply disappointed by the Trump administration, which deepened that trend, often in erratic, unpredictable, and even dangerous fashion. In particular, the UAE and America’s other allies in the Gulf were horrified when Washington refused to respond to brazen, repeated Iranian military attacks on Emirati and Saudi oil tankers in the summer of 2019, or even to the Iranian drone attack on Saudi Arabia’s irreplaceable Abqaiq oil processing plant. This was a categorical reversal of 40 years of American policy, the foundation of the US-Gulf partnership and of their security, which Trump abandoned without a second thought.
Meanwhile, the Netanyahu government applauded Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal but has been frustrated by his lack of interest in pushing back on Iran’s aggression around the region. Israel has been locked in a war of attrition with Iran across Syria and increasingly Iraq as Tehran builds up its military infrastructure in both countries and works to tie them — and Hizballah-dominated Lebanon — into a united, Iranian-led front. The Israelis have repeatedly begged Washington to do more to help them deal with Iran all to no avail.
And Iran isn't the only threat. Both Israel and the UAE know that Sunni jihadist groups are licking their chops as well.
In and of itself, this agreement is a laudable move, but the other pieces on the chessboard aren't going to sit idle.
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